Public health emergencies of international concern: Global, regional, and local responses to risk by Bennett, B & Carney, T
TITLE: Public Health Emergencies of International Concern: Global, Regional 
and Local Responses to Risk 
RUNNING TITLE: Public Health Emergencies of International Concern 
AUTHORS: Belinda Bennett & Terry Carney 
AFFILIATIONS: Belinda Bennett, Professor of Health Law, Australian Centre 
for Health Law Research, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, 
2 George Street, Brisbane, Qld, 4000, Australia. Email: 
belinda.bennett@qut.edu.au 
Terry Carney, Emeritus Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Eastern Ave., The 
University of Sydney, NSW, AUSTRALIA, 2006. Email: 
terry.carney@sydney.edu.au 
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Professor B Bennett, Professor of Health Law, 
Australian Centre for Health Law Research, School of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane, Qld, 4000, Australia. Email: 
belinda.bennett@qut.edu.au 
DECLARATIONS: An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 
conference ‘Biosecurity in a Globalised World’ Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT), Brisbane, 27 July 2015.  Research for this paper was 
supported by Discovery Grant (DP0987239) from the Australian Research 
Council. 
 2 
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN: 
GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL RESPONSES TO RISK 
The declaration in 2009 that the H1N1 pandemic constituted a 
public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) was the 
first such declaration under the revised International Health 
Regulations that were adopted in 2005.  This paper evaluates 
initiatives that have been introduced globally, within the Asia-
Pacific region, and within Australia, to strengthen preparedness 
for public health emergencies.  The paper analyses evolving 
conceptualisations of risk, surveillance of zoonotic diseases, and 











Risk is an elusive concept in management of infectious disease outbreaks.1  No 
activity is risk free, and the magnitude of ensuing harms is often unpredictable.  
This is especially true of any zoonotic disease outbreak showing signs of 
developing as a potential pandemic.  Social theorists such as Ulrich Beck2  
suggest that domestic policy settings have become more risk averse over recent 
decades, transforming governance.3  But management of risk is nevertheless 
central to pandemic preparedness,4 despite the competing ways of 
conceptualising it,5 ranging from the statistical to the more holistic.6   
In recent years, the system of global health governance and its capacity to 
respond effectively to public health emergencies has come under considerable 
                                            
1 Aileen J Plant, 'When Action Can't Wait:  Investigating Infectious Disease Outbreaks' in Gabriele 
Bammer and Michael Smithson (eds), Uncertainty and Risk:  Multidisciplinary perspectives 
(Earthscan, London 2008); Caroline Wraith and Niamh Stephenson, 'Risk, Insurance, 
Preparedness and the Disappearance of the Population: The case of pandemic influenza' (2009) 18 
Health Sociol Rev 220. 
2 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new modernity (Sage, London 1992); Ulrich Beck, World Risk 
Society (Polity, Malden, Mass 1999). 
3 Gabe Mythen, 'The Problem of Governance in the Risk Society: Envisaging Strategies, Managing 
Not-knowing' in Urbano Fra.Paleo (ed), Risk Governance: The articulation of hazard, politics and 
ecology (Springer, Dordrecht 2015). 
4 Terry Carney, Richard Bailey and Belinda Bennett, 'Pandemic Planning as Risk Management:  
How fared the Australian federation?' (2012) 19 J Law Med 550. 
5 Theresa Seetoh, Marco Liverani and Richard Coker, 'Framing Risk in Pandemic Influenza Policy 
and Control' (2012) 7 Glob Public Health 717. 
6 For a recent review see, Valerie November and Yvan Leanza, Risk, Disaster and Crisis Reduction 
(Risk, Disaster and Crisis Reduction, Springer, Dordrecht 2015), 8-11. 
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scrutiny, due to a succession of disease outbreaks.7  The 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic,8 the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa,9 the spread of Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV),10 the spread of Zika virus and 
its link to birth defects,11 and an epidemic of yellow fever in Angola and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,12 have all posed major threats to human 
health, with H1N1, Ebola, and Zika each declared global public health 
emergencies by the World Health Organization.13  In the wake of each emergency 
has come global soul-searching over the best way of strengthening our capacity 
for the future. 
                                            
7 Ali Khan and William Patrick, The Next Pandemic: On the front line against humankind's gravest 
dangers (PublicAffairs, New York 2016). 8 World Health Organization, Evolution of a Pandemic 
A(H1N1) 2009 – April 2009-August 2010 (2nd edn, World Health Organization, Geneva 2013). 
8 World Health Organization, Evolution of a Pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 – April 2009-August 2010 (2nd 
edn, World Health Organization, Geneva 2013). 
9 Lawrence O Gostin and Eric A Friedman, 'A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of the West 
African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation and an 
Empowered WHO at the Apex' (2015) 385 Lancet 1902. 
10 World Health Organization, 'Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)' 
2015) <www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/mers-cov/en/> accessed 1 September 2016; 
Chiara Poletto, Pierre-Yves Boelle and Vittoria Colizza, 'Risk of MERS Importation and Onward 
Transmission: A Systematic Review and Analysis of Cases Reported to WHO' (2016) BMC Infect 
Dis 488. 
11 David L Heymann and others, 'Zika virus and microcephaly: why is this situation a PHEIC?' 
(2016) The Lancet http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140. 
12 Daniel Lucey and Lawrence O Gostin, 'A Yellow Fever Epidemic: A New Global Health 
Emergency?' (2016) ### JAMA . 
13 World Health Organization, Evolution of a Pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 – April 2009-August 2010##; 
World Health Organization, WHO Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations 
Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. 
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/ (2014); World Health 
Organization, 'WHO Statement on the First Meeting of the International Health Regulations 
(2005) (IHR 2005) Emergency Committee on Zika Virus and Observed Increase in Neurological 
Disorders and Neonatal Malformations' 2016) 
<www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/1st-emergency-committee-zika/en/> 
accessed 4 March 2016. 
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While Tom Koch has provocatively suggested that the real pandemic is 
that of our collective hubris about the adequacy of our pre-planning,14 this paper 
argues that the challenges of managing uncertainty remain at the centre of 
preparedness for and responding to public health emergencies of international 
concern.  As we argue here, although there has been considerable strengthening 
of global public health law over the past decade with the introduction of the 
revised International Health Regulations in 2005, risk continues to be an evolving 
concept in the context of preparedness for public health emergencies, while the 
challenge of building capacity, not only at the level of individual countries but 
also regionally and globally; the continued tensions between global cooperation 
and national sovereignty; and the balancing of human rights in response to 
public health emergencies, continue to present legal and ethical challenges in this 
area.  
II RISK AND THE IHRS 
The backstory to the modernisation of the international health emergency 
response framework to its current manifestation in the International Health 
Regulations (2005) has been told before.15  What is less commented on is the 
                                            
14 Tom Koch, 'Hubris: The recurring pandemic' (2015) 9 Disaster Med Public Health Prep 51. 
15 David P. Fidler, 'From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New 
International Health Regulations' (2005) 4  Chinese JIL 325; David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. 
Gostin, 'The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International 
Law and Public Health' (2006) 34  J Law Med Ethics 85. 
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unusual model or ‘design’ of those regulations due to the special characteristic of 
uncertainty associated with the health threats sought to be managed.    
As Lakoff observes, pandemic response planning for emerging or 
uncertain events tends to opt for ‘sentinel’ systems which identify possible 
warning signs to set in train decision-making protocols or plans, rather than rely 
on known risk levels to trigger preordained and often ‘disciplinary’ responses 
such as quarantine.16  The two main approaches (ie risk management and 
vigilance) are quite different, as Lakoff17 nicely explains: 
Risk management… involves the creation of a common space of calculation 
through which planners can predict the likelihood of future events; whereas 
vigilance, in contrast, assumes that the future cannot be known and that one 
must therefore be prepared for surprise.  
However sentinel devices (such as monitoring shifts in emergency ward 
admissions or patterns of pharmaceutical use) differ from risk management 
grounded in historical experience derived from monitoring past experience with 
known risks in that they,  
                                            
16 Andrew Lakoff, 'Real-time Biopolitics: The actuary and the sentinel in global public health' 
(2015) 44 Econ Soc 40, 42. 
17 Ibid, 45. 
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do not operate on their own but are integrated into a broader system of alert 
and-response, one that includes preparedness plans that instruct officials in 
how to respond and decision instruments that guide governmental intervention 
as the event unfolds.18  
Managing uncertainty, then, lies at the heart of pandemic response planning, and 
the WHO machinery for managing information on possible epidemics, ranging 
across the spectrum from rumours to information from governments or trawling 
of electronic sources, is highly sophisticated.19  Risk communication during 
public health emergencies remains a highly complex matter, requiring 
recognition of uncertainty and building of trust with the public.20  
In terms of the IHR themselves, the 2005 revisions moved away from the 
narrow focus of the previous IHR which had addressed the reporting of ‘known’ 
risks encompassing three diseases only: plague, cholera and yellow fever.  In 
contrast, the revised IHR reflected a blended approach with reporting to WHO 
required for certain diseases of known risk (including SARS and new sub-types 
of human influenza); and assessment of risk using a decision instrument 
contained in the IHR required for some other diseases of known risk, (including 
pneumonic plague, cholera and yellow fever), ‘that have demonstrated the 
                                            
18 Ibid, 46. 
19 November and Leanza, Risk, Disaster and Crisis Reduction (n 6), 37-65; Sara E. Davies, 'Nowhere 
to Hide: Informal Disease Surveillance Networks Tracing State Behaviour' (2012) 24 Global 
Change, Peace and Security 95  
20 Gaby-Fleur Bol, 'Risk Communication in Times of Crisis' (2016) 17  EMBO Rep 1. 
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ability to cause serious public health impact and to spread rapidly 
internationally,’ although it should be noted that Ebola, a disease with which 
there is some previous experience, caught the international community by 
surprise with the scale of the recent outbreak in West Africa.  The third approach 
encompasses, to borrow from Lakoff, the vigilance approach required of an 
unknowable future event by requiring reporting to WHO of “any event of 
potential international public health concern”.21 
Although the revised IHR require countries to develop their capacity for 
surveillance of public health events within their territory,22 the 2005 revisions also 
allow WHO to take account of reports from other sources of events that may 
constitute a public health emergency of international concern.23  In doing so 
however, WHO must request verification of any such reports from the affected 
country, and offer to collaborate with the affected country in assessing the event 
and the adequacy of the control measures.24  This potential for WHO to take 
account of other sources of information about disease outbreaks or other possible 
public health emergencies allows information from NGOs, media reports and 
social media to inform decision-making about possible global public health 
                                            
21 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005) (2nd edition edn, Geneva 
2008), Annex 2. 
22 Ibid, Article 5. 
23 Ibid, Article 9. 
24 Ibid, Article 10. 
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emergencies.25  Importantly, this development moves the revised IHR beyond a 
binary WHO-country relationship, thus reflecting the multiplicity of actors 
inherent in the crowded landscape of contemporary global health.26 As Davies 
and Youde argue, the changes in the revised IHR ‘introduce a host of new eyes 
and ears to keep watch and hold governments accountable for their response to 
public health emergencies.’27 
Informal reports of disease outbreaks and analysis social media not only 
potentially provide some early warning of unusual events, but also make it more 
difficult for states to hide disease outbreaks.28  In this context, there are complex 
relationships between informal and state-based reporting, and engagement by 
the state with the public.29  In addition, widespread use of the internet and social 
media also opens new possibilities for what has been termed ‘digital 
participatory surveillance’ in which citizens and volunteers report on disease, 
thus supplementing traditional disease surveillance mechanisms.30 
                                            
25 Sara E Davies and Jeremy  Youde, 'The IHR (2005), Disease Surveillance, and the Individual in 
Global Health Politics' (2013) 17  IJHR 133. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Davies and Youde, 'The IHR (2005), Disease Surveillance, and the Individual in Global Health 
Politics' (n 25) at 139. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Sara E Davies, 'The Challenge to Know and Control: Disease Outbreak Surveillance and Alerts 
in China and India' (2012) 7  Glob Public Health 695.  
30 Claudia Pagilari and Santosh Vijaykumar, 'Digital Participatory Surveillance and the Zika 
Crisis: Oppotunities and Caveats' (2016) 10  e0004795. doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0004795. PLoS 
Negl. Trop. Dis.  See also, Gabriel J Milinovich and others, 'Internet-based Surveillance Systems 
for Monitoring Emerging Infectious Diseases' (2014) 14  Lancet Inf Dis 160. 
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The need for flexibility and an approach premised on unknowable risk has 
been evident in the evaluations of preparedness for and responses to the 2009 
H1N1 influenza pandemic.  Although there was considerable work globally and 
nationally in the early-mid 2000s to plan and prepare for an influenza pandemic, 
much of this work was in preparation for a pandemic caused by the more lethal 
H5N1 avian influenza virus.31  Thus, although a pandemic was declared by WHO 
in 2009 in response to H1N1, the relative mildness of the disease when compared 
to the H5N1 virus presented challenges for WHO and for individual countries in 
adapting their responses during the pandemic in light of evolving information 
about risk.32  In response to this, WHO’s revised pandemic guidance adopts a 
more flexible, all hazards approach.33  This more flexible approach to pandemic 
planning is also reflected in the most recent version of Australia’s Health 
Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza.34  
Recognition of the gradations of risk is also evident in the recent 
recommendation by the Interim Ebola Panel Report for an ‘intermediate’ level in 
the declaration of a public health emergency of international concern.  As the 
                                            
31 World Health Organization, Comparative Analysis of National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Plans (World Health Organization,, Geneva 2011). 
32 Belinda Bennett and Terry Carney, 'Planning for Pandemics: Lessons from the Past Decade' 
(2015) 12  J Bioeth Inq 419. 
33 Ibid; Belinda Bennett, 'Updating Australia's Pandemic Preparedness: The Revised Australian 
Health Management for Pandemic Influenza' (2015) 22 , J Law Med, 506, 508; World Health 
Organization, Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: WHO Interim Guidance (2013). 
34 Bennett, 'Updating Australia's Pandemic Preparedness: The Revised Australian Health 
Management for Pandemic Influenza' (n 33) 18.  
 11 
Report noted, under the current IHR ‘there is either a PHEIC or there is not’,35 
with the recommendation for consideration to be given to ‘the possibility of an 
intermediate level that would alert and engage the wider international 
community at an earlier stage in a health crisis’.36  Because only PHEICs (along 
with the IHRs) have any real normative status under international law,37 this may 
also promote public understanding of the array of other functions and 
responsibilities of WHO in coordinating international management of potential 
pandemic episodes.38  Furthermore, expert committees appointed to consider the 
global response to the Ebola outbreak have recommended considerable 
strengthening of WHO’s capacity to respond to global public health emergencies, 
including the creation of a Contingency Fund to support rapid response to 
emergencies at an early stage.39 
                                            
35 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (2015), 13. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Pedro A Villarreal, 'Pandemic Declarations of the World Health Organization as an Exercise of 
International Public Authority: The Possible Legal Answers to Frictions Between Legitimacies' 
(2016) 7  Go JIL 95, 108-113.  This does not mean that other parts of the WHO armoury do not 
have significant normative force, merely that the authority stems from other sources of legitimacy 
or authority outside international law.  For instance the ‘name and shame’ scheme is an effective 
means of encouraging compliance with guidelines as well as in reinforcing the international 
obligations associated with the IHRs (and PHEICs): ibid, 111.   
38 For a recent review of the strengths and limitations of WHO pandemic management 
capabilities see:  Lawrence O Gostin and Rebecca Katz, 'The International Health Regulations: 
The Governing Framework for Global Health Security' (2016) 94  Milbank Q 264. 
39 For discussion see, Lawrence O Gostin and others, 'Toward a Common Secure Future: Four 
Global Commissions in the Wake of Ebola' (2016) 13(5): e1002042. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042 PLoS Med; Belinda Bennett, 'Where to Now for Reform of 
Global Health Governance? ' (2016) 24  Jo Law Med 7 
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This evolution in the conceptualisation of risk recognises the considerable 
uncertainty that exists in relation to new and emerging infectious diseases and 
the need for planning and response capacity to be flexible and adaptable.  The 
challenges of accurately predicting risk are considerable.  The International 
Health Regulations are designed to empower international leadership (from the 
WHO) to facilitate coordinated international preparedness for and response to 
pandemic events.  However in the nature of uncertainty and with the wisdom of 
the perfect vision of hindsight, commentators have been unflattering of WHO’s 
record of achievement in managing recent international health emergencies, 
including delays in responding to Ebola in West Africa in 2014, and a perceived 
over-reaction to H1N1 (swine flu) in 2009-10,40 leading to calls for reform of 
WHO and global health governance more generally.41  While the speedy 
communication and collaboration fostered by the IHRs is credited with enabling 
a very rapid response to fellow passengers exposed to a MERS carrier on a 
                                            
40 Benton Heath, 'Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola' (2015) 57  Harvard Int Law J 1; 
Adam Kamradt-Scott, 'WHO's to Blame? The World Health Organization and the 2014 Ebola 
Outbreak in West Africa' (2016) 37 ; Third World Q 401; Villarreal, 'Pandemic Declarations of the 
World Health Organization as an Exercise of International Public Authority: The Possible Legal 
Answers to Frictions Between Legitimacies' (n 37). 
41 Gostin and Friedman, 'A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of the West African Ebola 
Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation and an Empowered 
WHO at the Apex' (n 9); Gostin and others, 'Toward a Common Secure Future: Four Global 
Commissions in the Wake of Ebola' (n 39); Colin McInnes, 'WHO's Next? Changing Authority in 
Global Health Governance After Ebola' (2015) 91  Int Aff 1299 
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flight,42 others are critical of their current adequacy,43 while common responses 
such as airport border screening has been panned as ineffective,44 at least on any 
scientific basis (what it does for public confidence is another matter).   
As conceptualisations of risk and infectious diseases have broadened to 
encompass currently unknown risks, so too has there been a broader approach to 
the sources of risk.  The increasing contributions to emerging disease threats 
stemming from rising population, urbanisation, de-forestation and other 
environmental pressures,45 has put the spotlight on diseases such as Ebola, or 
swine and bird flu, where the pathogen originated in non-human populations 
such as bats, birds, pigs or camels.  One consequence has been a broadening of 
the planning horizon to incorporate paying attention to the ecological context of 
such diseases.  Indeed some commentators argue that current pandemic plans 
are too narrow, calling for a more holistic ecological ‘one–health’ response 
                                            
42 Kowk-ming Poon and others, 'International Health Regulations (2005) facilitate communication 
for in-flight contacts of a Middle East respiratory syndrome case, Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 2014' (2015) 6  Western Pac Surveill Response J 1. 
43 Rebecca Katz and Scott F Dowell, 'Revising the International Health Regulations: call for a 2017 
review conference' (2015)   Lancet Glob Health; Trygve Ottersen, Steven J. Hoffman and Gaelle 
Groux, 'Ebola Shows the International Health Regulations Are Broken: What Can Be Done 
Differently to Prepare for the Next Epidemic?' (2016) 42  Am J Law Med 356. 
44 Linda A Selvey, Catarina Antão and Robert Hall, 'Evaluation of border entry screening for 
infectious diseases in humans' (2015) 21  Emerg Infect Dis 197 
45 Jennifer S Edge and Steven J Hoffman, 'Strengthening National Health Systems’ Capacity to 
Respond to Future Global Pandemics' in Sara E Davies and Jeremy R Youde (eds), The Politics of 
Surveillance and Response to Disease Outbreaks: The New Frontier for States and Non-state Actors 
(Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey UK 2015); Lakoff, 'Real-time Biopolitics: The actuary and the sentinel 
in global public health' (n 16), 51. 
 14 
embracing anthropological, ecological and veterinary dimensions,46 though the 
very breadth of the ‘One-Health’ concept presents challenges for its 
conceptualisation and operationalisation.47  
III BUILDING CAPACITY 
Pandemic response capacity at the national level is multi-layered and resource 
demanding, so countries vary greatly in their ability (or willingness) to build 
capacities such as having enough or sufficiently proximate access to testing 
laboratories.48  This is especially the case for developing countries in regions such 
as South East Asia, where implementation of the IHRs is patchy due to resource 
and logistical challenges.49  To assist the region to meet the IHRs mid-2014 
deadline for development of core capacities, the Asia-Pacific Strategy for 
Emerging Diseases (‘APSED’) was developed, originally in 2005 and updated in 
                                            
46 Benjamin Capps and others, 'Introducing One Health to the Ethical Debate About Zoonotic 
Diseases in Southeast Asia' (2015) 29 Bioethics 588.  As succinctly put by Dr Ali Khan , the former 
director of the Office of Health Preparedness and Response at the US Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the one health approach to risk involves, ‘not just to focus on humans but also 
the implicated animals and the environment to identify potentially novel prevention strategies’ 
Khan and Patrick, The Next Pandemic: On the front line against humankind's gravest dangers (n 7) 45.  
47 Marcel Verweij and Bernice Bovenkerk, 'Ethical Promises and Pitfalls of OneHealth' (2016) 9 
Public Health Ethics 1; Kelley Lee and Zabrina L Brumme, 'Operationalizing the One-Health 
Approach: The Global Governance Challenges' (2013) 28  Health Policy Plann 778. 
48 Edge and Hoffman, 'Strengthening National Health Systems’ Capacity to Respond to Future 
Global Pandemics' (n 45); Sara E Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton, Disease 
Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore 2015). 
49 WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and the Asia Pacific 
Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED), Report of a regional meeting, Bangkok, Thailand, 24–26 June 
2014, 2015). 
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2010.50  Progress was favourably reviewed at a bi-regional meeting in Nepal in 
July 2013, but all 11 countries in the South-East Asia region had obtained a two 
year extension to June 2014 on meeting core requirements, with some anticipated 
to need a further such extension,51 and although all countries were reported to 
have a pandemic plan, its form and content varied considerably.52   
 The challenges associated with building capacity are significant.  
Although the IHR require countries to build certain core capacities within their 
health systems, the recent report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel noted: 
 
As at November 2014, 64 States Parties informed the Secretariat that they had achieved 
these core capacities, 81 requested extensions and 48 did not communicate their status or 
intentions.53  
 
Noting that ‘When the health of all is at stake, information must be validated 
through some form of peer review or other external assessment’,54 the Panel 
considered the current system of voluntary self-assessment of IHR core capacities 
to be ‘unacceptable’ and recommended costed and independently assessed plans 
                                            
50 WHO, Asia-Pacific Strategy for Emerging diseases (APSED), 2015), 1-2. 
51 Ibid, 3, 55. 
52 Ibid, 46.  To rectify this it has recently been argued that development of legislative and related 
resources should be part of the suite of capacity-building within the WHO: Géraldine Marks-
Sultan and others, 'National Public Health Law: A role for WHO in capacity-building and 
promoting transparency' (2016) 94  Bull. World Health Organ, 534 
53 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (n 35), 10. 
54 Ibid, 11. 
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for development of IHR core capacities, an approach that has also been 
recommended by other international expert panels:55 
 WHO should propose a prioritized and costed plan, based on independently 
assessed information, to develop core capacities required under the International Health 
Regulations (2005) for all countries. The financing of this plan is to be done in close 
partnership with the World Bank.56   
 
For low resource countries, regional cooperation may provide important 
opportunities to build capacity and preparedness.  In Southeast Asia for 
example, many countries within the region have limited resources.  The region 
has also been the location for the emergence of a number of communicable 
diseases in recent years including SARS, avian influenza (H5N1), and Nipah 
virus.57  The tropical climate of many Southeast Asian countries also means that 
vector-borne diseases such as dengue and chikungunya pose ongoing threats to 
public health.58  At the time of writing Zika virus, another vector-borne disease, is 
causing concern in Southeast Asia.59  
                                            
55 Gostin and others, 'Toward a Common Secure Future: Four Global Commissions in the Wake 
of Ebola' (n 41). For discussion see also, Bennett [tbc] 
56 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (n 35), 6. 
57 Richard J Coker and others, 'Emerging Infectious Diseases in South-East Asia: Regional 
Challenges to Control' (2011) 377 Lancet 599. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Isaac I Bogoch and others, 'Potential for Zika Virus Introduction and Transmission in Resource-
Limited Countries in Africa and the Asia-Pacific Region: A Modelling Study'  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473 Lancet Inf Dis; Editorial, 'Zika's Emerging Threat for the Asia-
Pacific Region' (2016) 388 Lancet 1026. 
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 Regional initiatives include the Asia Pacific Strategy on Emerging 
Diseases,60 which ‘serves as a key regional tool to help countries meet their IHR 
core capacity requirements’61 although a recent review noted that challenges still 
remain in strengthening capacity within the region.62  Other regional initiatives 
for infectious diseases include the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network, 
and the East African Integrated Disease Surveillance Network.63  Still other 
initiatives exist at the sub-regional level.  These include the Mekong Basin 
Disease Surveillance initiative, which covers ‘Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Vietnam and the Yunnan and Guangxi provinces of China.’64  
 Bond et al65 describe three phases in the development of these sub-
regional disease surveillance networks.  The first phase, from 1996-2007, was one 
during which the networks were established and attention was largely focused 
on diseases of local concern and training of personnel.  During phase two, which 
was from 2003-2009, the focus shifted to national and cross-border surveillance to 
                                            
60 WHO, Asia-Pacific Strategy for Emerging diseases (APSED) (n 50).  For discussion see Coker and 
others, 'Emerging Infectious Diseases in South-East Asia: Regional Challenges to Control' (n 57). 
61  WHO, Asia-Pacific Strategy for Emerging diseases (APSED) (n 50) at 1-2.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Katherine C Bond and others, 'The Evolution and Expansion of Regional Disease Surveillance 
Networks and Their Role in Mitigating the Threat of Infectious Disease Outbreaks' (2013) 6: 19913  
http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ehtj.v6i0.19913 Emerg Health Threats J at [2]. 
64 Melinda Moore and David J Dausey, 'Local Cross-Border Disease Surveillance and Control: 
Experiences from the Mekong Basin' (2015) 8 DOI 10.1186/s13104 BMC Res Notes, at [2]. See also, 
Coker and others, 'Emerging Infectious Diseases in South-East Asia: Regional Challenges to 
Control' (n 57). 
65 Bond and others, 'The Evolution and Expansion of Regional Disease Surveillance Networks 
and Their Role in Mitigating the Threat of Infectious Disease Outbreaks' (n 65). 
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address diseases in border regions including HIV/AIDS and regional threats 
such as SARS.  This was also the period during which the revised IHR were 
adopted and came into effect, which also focused national and regional 
commitment on IHR compliance.  Finally, in phase three, which began in 2006 
and continues to the present, Bond et al note growing cooperation between 
regional networks, a focus on strengthening preparedness for pandemic 
influenza, and the establishment of Connecting Organizations for Disease 
Surveillance (CORDS) to share expertise and learning between regional 
networks.66 
Sub-regional disease surveillance initiatives provide a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to transnational cooperation,67 and are in contrast to the ‘more formal 
networks in geographic regions designated by the World Health Organization.’68  
Importantly, surveillance networks can play an important complementary role, 
supplementing more formal disease surveillance programs at the national, 
regional and global level.69  Bond et al also argue that disease surveillance 
networks can assist capacity building in low and middle-income countries: 
Regional disease surveillance networks prioritize building trust-based relationships that 
enable informal reporting and the rapid sharing of sensitive information; and enabling 
                                            
66 Ibid. 
67 Moore and Dausey, 'Local Cross-Border Disease Surveillance and Control: Experiences from 
the Mekong Basin' (n 64) at [1]-[2]. 
68 Bond and others, 'The Evolution and Expansion of Regional Disease Surveillance Networks 
and Their Role in Mitigating the Threat of Infectious Disease Outbreaks' (n 63) at [1]. 
69 Ibid at [5]. 
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cross-border collaboration and the strengthening of technical capacity to detect and 
respond to infectious diseases in peripheral border areas with marginalized 
populations.70 
 
Furthermore, they argue that network systems provide a multidimensional 
approach that is well-suited to responding rapidly to the changing conditions of 
infectious disease outbreaks and allowing for multidisciplinary and cross-
sectoral engagement that may be needed for effective disease outbreak response 
and research.71  Finally, Bond et al argue that networks allow for maintenance of 
national sovereignty, allow professionals to engage cooperatively, and foster 
trust and collaboration,72 although they acknowledge that ‘language and cultural 
differences, along with the broader geopolitical context, often present barriers to 
effective cooperation.’73  
 Clearly, the challenge of building national capacity for disease 
surveillance and response, particularly within low income countries, remains.  
As outlined above, regional and sub-regional cooperation offers one possible 
approach to assist with capacity building in response to shared risks. 
                                            
70 Ibid at [7]. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid at [8]. 
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IV GLOBAL COOPERATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The adoption of the revisions to the IHR in 2005 represented a significant 
achievement in global health.74  At its heart the IHR represented agreement in the 
international community on the importance of strengthening the systems for 
global public health.  However in the decade since the adoption of the IHR it has 
been clear that tensions continue to exist between global cooperation and 
national sovereignty.   
 The tensions between the global and the national are evident in two main 
areas: first, in the setting of priorities at a national level and building of IHR core 
capacities; and secondly, in the use of measures impacting upon trade or travel 
by individual countries in response to perceived risks in global health.  The issue 
of capacity building has been mentioned above.  Part of the challenge in building 
capacity is, as a number of commentators have point out, that although the IHR 
require the building of core capacities, they do not allocate funding to support 
it.75  While the recommendation of the Interim Ebola Panel Report discussed 
                                            
74 Fidler, 'From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New 
International Health Regulations' (n 15); Fidler and Gostin, 'The New International Health 
Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health' (n 15). 
75 Rebecca Katz and J. Fischer, 'The Revised International Health Regulations: A Framework for 
Global Pandemic Response' (2010) 3  Glob Health Gov 1 
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above provides one possible avenue for future strengthening of capacity, it is 
clear that considerable challenges remain.76 
 The second area in which the tensions between the national and global are 
evident is in the responses of individual countries to perceived risks in global 
health.  Article 43 of the IHR requires that any additional health measures 
introduced by countries in response to either a specific public health risk or a 
public health emergency of international concern should be no more restrictive 
or invasive ‘than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the 
appropriate level of health protection’77 and be based on scientific principles; 
available scientific evidence about risk; and any guidance or advice from WHO.78  
 Despite these requirements, there were some cases of the use of travel 
restrictions during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic79 and more recently during the 
                                            
76 For a recent review of the magnitude of this problem (with many countries not even reporting 
to WHO on compliance) and a detailed set of proposals to address the real-politik of global 
political and other barriers responsible for the lack of leadership provided by the WHO, see 
Gostin and Katz, 'The International Health Regulations: The Governing Framework for Global 
Health Security' (n 38), 276-306.  In addition to such global investment and establishment by each 
nation of a multi-focus ‘emergency operations center’, Dr Ali Khan suggests establishing a United 
Nations undersecretary for health security with the task of ‘mobilizing all global entities to 
ensure that preparedness and response discussions are at the level of the head of state and not 
just the minister or secretary of health’: Khan and Patrick, The Next Pandemic: On the front line 
against humankind's gravest dangers (n 7) 257. 
77 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005) (n 21), Article 43(1). 
78 Ibid, Article 43(2). 
79 Katz and Fischer, 'The Revised International Health Regulations: A Framework for Global 
Pandemic Response' (n 75); World Health Organization, Strengthening Response to Pandemics and 
Other Public Health Emergencies: Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International 
Health Regulations (2005) and on Pandemic Influenza (H1N1) 2009 (World Health Organization, 
Geneva 2011), 62; Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and 
Global Health Security (n 48). 
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outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014 with the Interim Ebola Panel Report 
noting that: 
during the Ebola outbreak, more than 40 countries implemented additional measures 
that significantly interfered with international traffic, outside the scope of the temporary 
recommendations issued by the Director-General on the advice of the Emergency 
Committee. As a result, the countries affected faced not only severe political, economic 
and social consequences but also barriers to receiving necessary personnel and supplies. 
These consequences constituted a significant disincentive to transparency.80 
 
The lack of enforcement mechanisms to address actions taken that are not in 
accordance with the IHR is one of the IHR’s noted weaknesses81 and the Interim 
Ebola Panel Report recommended that consideration be given to disincentives 
for countries taking action beyond that recommended by WHO.82 
 These tensions between global and national interests are some of the most 
challenging ones in contemporary management of global public health 
emergencies83 and their resolution is vital for effective responses to public health 
emergencies.  The recent Ebola Interim Panel Report noted: 
                                            
80 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (n 35), 11. 
81 Trygve Ottersen, Steven J. Hoffman and Gaelle Groux, 'Ebola Shows the International Health 
Regulations Are Broken: What Can Be Done Differently to Prepare for the Next Epidemic?' (n 43), 
378-379. 
82 World Health Organization, Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (n 35), 6. 
83 Many factors have been suggested to account for undermining of global cooperation in public 
health, including public panic over Ebola (that ‘those who live in the developing world are 
dangerous vectors of contagion needing to be kept at bay’) and the legacy of messages about 
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Whereas health is considered the sovereign responsibility of countries, the means to fulfil 
this responsibility are increasingly global, and require international collective action and 
effective and efficient governance of the global health system.84  
 
Indeed, such is the shared nature of global public health that the Panel has 
suggested that ‘countries must have a notion of “shared sovereignty”’.85   
It has been suggested however that conceptualising global health 
governance in terms of shared responsibility for disease is a flawed approach as 
it does not clearly define roles, allocation of responsibilities, and 
accountabilities.86  This ‘shared’ approach thus contributes, according to 
Wenham, to challenges with enforceability of the requirements for global health, 
including the IHR.87  Indeed, Wenham argues that ‘a core problem with the 
global health framework as it stands is the very concept of shared 
responsibility.’88  Referring to other examples in global health in which 
responsibilities are more clearly articulated, including the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, Wenham argues: 
                                                                                                                                  
never allowing a repetition of the delayed response to HIV:  Michael S Sinha and Wendy E 
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85 Ibid, 10. 
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Fundamentally the global health architecture must find a way be able hold individual 
stakeholders accountable in order for global efforts in disease control to be effective. 
There should be delineated roles and responsibilities, where each actor in the framework 
has a designated position within the global disease control matrix and understands what 
their responsibilities are for and to whom.89 
Wenham suggests three possible recommendations for the development of 
clearer designations of responsibility in global health.  First, she suggests 
learning from other governance arrangements in global health including, for 
example, the clear goal setting that accompanied both the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals as focusing 
attention on areas of need.  As Wenham argues, ‘multiple devolved 
arrangements with clearer tangible goals between actors bilaterally or 
multilaterally could provide a more fruitful result than broader normative calls 
for global shared responsibility for improving global health security.’90  Secondly, 
Wenham argues for improved financing to support global health security, and 
finally, for the development of enforcement mechanisms or incentives to support 
IHR compliance.91 
 Clearly national sovereignty plays a critical role in strengthening global 
health security.  Cooperation between WHO Member States is vital to the 
development and implementation of a common global approach to infectious 
                                            
89 Ibid at 445. 
90 Ibid at 446. 
91 Ibid at 446-447. 
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diseases.  Yet without the clarity of responsibilities advocated by Wenham, and 
the associated accountability and enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure 
that countries are meeting their obligations under the IHR, global health 
governance of risk management for infectious diseases will remain patchy and 
imperfect.  
V HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
Human rights principles referred to in the IHRs are one check against excesses of 
state power in preparedness for and the management of public health 
emergencies,92 but those rights are framed quite loosely, leaving much doubt 
about the level and form of protection intended.93  Furthermore, the need to take 
account of social vulnerability94 and gender95 in emergency preparedness and 
response reveals the need for broad and inclusive understandings of human 
rights in the context of public health emergencies. 
                                            
92 As Davies and Youde note, ‘The IHR (2005)’s emphasis on human rights adds a useful 
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requirement for states to meet their IHR obligations.’ Davies and Youde, 'The IHR (2005), Disease 
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The risk of abrogation of human rights in pandemic response 
management is heightened because the urgency of the situation calls for exercise 
of executive rather than of judicial or legislative powers under emergency laws.96  
This is true of the powers entrusted to the Director-General of the WHO when 
declaring public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC) and 
issuing temporary (3 month) recommendations about how to deal with it.  While 
the Director-General operates within a procedural framework (including advice 
from an Expert Committee, consideration of views of affected nations and an 
algorithm-based decision-instrument) the powers are unfettered beyond going 
through that minimally consultative process.  While those internal WHO 
processes certainly help to regularise decision-making by reducing the risk of 
arbitrary or idiosyncratic exercise of the Director-General’s powers, it does not 
overcome the criticism that there is no merits review or other check, or overcome 
concerns that undue weight may be given to expert scientific input at the 
expense of political or other considerations,97 suggesting that a ‘global governor 
                                            
96 James G Hodge and Evan D Anderson, 'Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public 
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who operates in the liminal space between expertise and political decision risks 
taking action that can be justified on neither ground’.98  Heath therefore argues 
for what may be termed deliberative democratic (or ‘transparency’) reforms, 
including ‘managed decentralization, epistemic openness, and forc[ed] dissent’,99 
though paradoxically others see benefit in confining the grounding of exercise of 
IHR powers to such objective scientific material.100   
The domestic laws of nation states likewise rely heavily on executive 
action at the outset, with any judicial or independent merits review scrutiny 
reserved to an ‘after the fact’ role.101  The executive issue to a person of a 
biosecurity control order and the subsequent internal review rights by the 
Director-General under Australia’s new Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth)102 is a case in 
point.  The provision of rights to a subsequent merits review by the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal103 and a speedy decision by the AAT within no 
more than an initial 7 days or any extended 7 day period104 establishes an avenue 
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of external review of this power, and this arguably meets relevant human rights 
expectations.105  Nevertheless, the proportionality balances are fine ones, as 
illustrated in other spheres such as civil commitment powers in respect of mental 
illness (or alcohol and drug addiction) where similar debates arise between 
models requiring judicial authority to detain and those empowering executive 
action by clinicians, subject to post-admission external review.106 
Of course responding to a genuine emergency necessarily involves some 
modification to standard human rights and their manner of protection, but as 
Zidar points out, there are two main models of what international law requires:  
a ‘limitations’ model which ‘shrinks the framework of protection … from the full 
to a limited scope’ based on tests including rational relationship to legitimate 
public health aims and proportionality, and a ‘derogations’ model that 
temporarily suspends human rights other than certain inviolable ‘core’ rights.107  
As Zidar explains, in contrast to the linear (his word is ‘monocentric’) approach 
encompassed by both the limitations and derogations models, the approach 
encompassed by the IHR in responding to a public health emergency of 
international concern is polycentric and fluid (‘indeterminate and elusive’):  that 
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is there are many actors and variables in play, and responsive flexibility is the 
order of the day.108  One consequence is that there is room for both models, 
depending on the pandemic scenario or point in its trajectory, though the civil 
rights of respect for individual dignity and that of non-discrimination are 
suggested as being inviolable while rights to privacy, liberty and freedom of 
movement engage the proportionality principle of the limitations model.109     
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that risk remains a central concern in planning for and 
responding to global public health emergencies.  However, while 
conceptualisations of risk have become increasingly sophisticated and more 
flexible in recent years, the measures used to respond to those risks remain 
hampered by insufficient public health capacities and tensions between national 
sovereignty and global cooperation, while further work remains on the 
articulation of human rights in emergency contexts.  As Khan reminds us, in the 
‘endless dance’ between microbes and humans, it is the adequacy of risk 
management strategies that will determine ‘if Louis Pasteur was right when he 
said, “Gentlemen, it is the microbes that will have the last word”’.110  
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